Ivanti Connect Secure: Three Chained Zero-Days on the VPN Edge
Ivanti Connect Secure is back in the crosshairs. CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 were exploited as zero-days, chained with CVE-2026-104935, an authentication bypass and RCE path, before disclosure. CISA set agency deadlines of November 2 and November 13. VPN appliances are the perimeter; a foothold here is a foothold inside. Here's the chain and the response.
Executive summary. Ivanti Connect Secure — the SSL VPN at the edge of a great many corporate networks — is again under active attack. CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 were exploited as zero-days, chained with CVE-2026-104935, an authentication bypass and remote-code-execution path, before disclosure. Ivanti says exploitation hit a limited number of customers pre-patch. CISA ordered federal agencies to remediate CVE-2026-111357 by 2 November and CVE-2026-118527 by 13 November 2026, and both are on KEV. VPN appliances are the single most consequential thing to get wrong: a foothold here is a foothold inside the perimeter, with the device's trust and often its credentials.
What it is
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Product | Ivanti Connect Secure (SSL VPN appliance) |
| CVEs | CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527, chained with CVE-2026-104935 |
| Chain | Authentication bypass → remote code execution |
| Exploitation | Zero-day, before disclosure; limited but real |
| KEV deadlines | 2 Nov (111357) and 13 Nov (118527) 2026 |
| Fix | Ivanti's patched Connect Secure builds |
How it works
Internet-facing Connect Secure appliance
│
▼
Authentication bypass (CVE-2026-104935)
│ reach functionality without valid creds
▼
RCE via CVE-2026-111357 + CVE-2026-118527
│
▼
Code execution on the VPN gateway ──► web shells, persistenceThe pattern mirrors prior Ivanti incidents: an auth bypass opens a door that a code-execution bug walks through. Chained, they turn an unauthenticated internet request into control of the appliance. Attackers who reach this point typically drop web shells, modify configuration, and attempt to survive reboots and upgrades — which is why patching alone, without hunting, is not enough.
Why it needs industry attention
Edge VPNs are pre-authentication attack surface facing the entire internet, and Ivanti Connect Secure has been a repeat target of sophisticated actors. "Exploited before disclosure" means defenders had no patch during the exposure window — so any internet-facing appliance should be treated as potentially already touched. The device sits astride all remote access, so compromise can mean credential capture and lateral movement into everything behind it.
Fix and mitigation
- Apply Ivanti's patched Connect Secure builds for the full chain now; prioritize internet-facing appliances.
- Run Ivanti's Integrity Checker Tool and compare against known-good; don't trust a compromised box to report its own health.
- Assume breach for exposed appliances. Hunt before you simply patch-and-move-on.
- Rotate secrets the appliance holds or could capture: service accounts, session secrets, and any credentials used for authentication.
How to detect it
- Web shells / unexpected files on the appliance; unfamiliar processes.
- Configuration changes and new admin users you didn't create.
- Outbound connections from the appliance to unfamiliar infrastructure.
- Integrity-checker mismatches and persistence that survives reboot/upgrade.
Conclusion
The Ivanti Connect Secure chain is another reminder that the VPN is the perimeter, and the perimeter is pre-auth. Patch the full chain, run the integrity checker, hunt the appliance as if it were already compromised, and rotate the secrets it could have exposed.
Do this now: patch internet-facing Connect Secure appliances for CVE-2026-111357/118527/104935, run the Integrity Checker Tool, hunt for web shells and config changes, and rotate appliance-held credentials.
Related: our state of exploitation report and the thread on hunting RMM and edge-device compromise.
Sources: Rapid7, Help Net Security, SecurityWeek. Chain details varied by source; confirm against Ivanti's advisories.
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