GCP Dataform CVE-2026-126054: Path Traversal That Crossed Tenant Boundaries

CVE-2026-126054 is a CVSS 9.3 path traversal in Google Cloud's Dataform (and BigQuery Studio and Colab Enterprise). Flawed workspace and Git path handling let an authenticated user read private files and create arbitrary files across other tenants' repositories. Google fixed it server-side, so there's no patch to apply, but the multi-tenant cloud isolation failure is worth understanding.

3 min readAdvanced

Executive summary. CVE-2026-126054 is a CVSS 9.3 path-traversal vulnerability in Google Cloud Dataform — and, because they share the workspace engine, in BigQuery Studio and Colab Enterprise. Flawed handling of workspace directories and Git integration let an authenticated, remote attacker read private files belonging to other tenants and create arbitrary files across tenant repositories. In a multi-tenant managed service, that is the failure mode that matters most: one customer reaching into another's data. Google fixed it server-side (bulletin gcp-2026-047), so there is no customer patch — but if you ran shared-tenant Dataform/BigQuery Studio/Colab workspaces before the fix, you should review what was in those repos and who could reach them.

GCP Dataform cross-tenant path traversal

What it is

Field Detail
CVE CVE-2026-126054 (published 20 Nov 2026)
Products Dataform, BigQuery Studio, Colab Enterprise
Weakness Path traversal in workspace / Git path handling
Impact Cross-tenant file read and write
Access Authenticated, remote
Severity CVSS 9.3 (critical)
Fix Server-side by Google (bulletin gcp-2026-047) — no customer action to patch

How it works

The isolation model assumed a workspace stays inside its own repository and that Git paths are confined to the tenant. The flaw broke that assumption:

text
 Authenticated user in a Dataform workspace
          │   supplies a path with traversal (../../)
          ▼
 Workspace / Git handler resolves outside the tenant repo
          │
          ├─► READ private files in other tenants
          └─► WRITE arbitrary files into other repos

Because BigQuery Studio and Colab Enterprise reuse the same workspace engine, the single flaw spanned three products. A sibling bug, CVE-2026-14934 (missing authorization in repository creation, CVSS 9.4), allowed cross-tenant repository takeover earlier in the year — the same class of tenant-isolation failure.

Why it needs industry attention

Cloud customers outsource isolation to the provider. When a managed analytics service lets one tenant traverse into another's files, it undermines the core promise of multi-tenancy. These bugs are patched by the provider, which is good — but it also means customers often never hear about their exposure window. For regulated data (finance, health, PII) flowing through Dataform/BigQuery Studio, "it was fixed server-side" may still trigger assessment and notification obligations.

What to do (there's no patch, but there is work)

  1. Read the bulletin (gcp-2026-047) and map which of your projects used Dataform, BigQuery Studio or Colab Enterprise before the fix.
  2. Review repository contents that lived in shared-tenant workspaces: secrets, credentials, or sensitive queries that a cross-tenant read could have exposed.
  3. Rotate any secrets that were stored in Dataform/Colab repos (they shouldn't be there anyway — move them to Secret Manager).
  4. Tighten access to workspaces and repos: least privilege on who can open and edit them.

How to detect / assess

  • Audit logs for Dataform/BigQuery Studio workspace and Git operations with unusual path components.
  • Unexpected files appearing in your repositories (the write primitive).
  • Access from principals that shouldn't have touched a given workspace.
  • Secrets-in-repo scans across Dataform/Colab content, to size the blast radius of any cross-tenant read.

Conclusion

CVE-2026-126054 is a tenant-isolation break in a mainstream cloud analytics stack. Google fixed it, but the lesson for customers is don't store secrets in notebooks/repos, review what lived in shared workspaces, and treat provider isolation bugs as events worth assessing, not shrugging off.

Do this now: check gcp-2026-047, inventory Dataform/BigQuery Studio/Colab usage, scan those repos for secrets and rotate any you find, and tighten workspace/repository access.

Related: our Learn track on cloud security assessment and the analysis of the Barracuda stale AI-vendor key breach.

Sources: Strix.ai CVE detail, OpenCVE, Mondoo (CVE-2026-14934). Dates varied by source; rely on Google's bulletin gcp-2026-047 for authoritative details.

HackersRoot Research · Research team

The HackersRoot research team investigates attack techniques across AI systems, cloud and identity, and enterprise networks, then publishes the detections and hardening guidance that stop them.

More from HackersRoot →

Related research

AppSec & Supply Chain

IBM Aspera Faspex CVE-2026-123218: One Crafted Request to Full Admin

IBM Aspera Faspex is enterprise managed file transfer. CVE-2026-123218 is an incorrect-authorization flaw (CWE-863, CVSS 9.8) in versions 5.0.0 to 5.0.19: an authorized user can craft a message that bypasses authorization checks and grants full administrative rights. It's on CISA KEV, and Faspex has a history of ransomware abuse. The fix is 5.0.19 Patch Level 1, with no workaround.